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Note
Collective Bargaining Agreements
and the Minnesota Public Employer
Although the terms and conditions of private employ-
ment are normally governed by collective bargaining
agreements, much uncertainty surrounds the legal status
of such agreements in public employment. Despite this
uncertainty many public employers in Minnesota have
found it necessary to enter into these bilateral agreements
to secure harmonious labor relations. The author of this
Note analyzes present Minnesota lav and concludes that
public employers in this state may enter binding collective
bargaining agreements that include many of the provi-
sions found in equivalent agreements in private industry.
INTRODUCTION
All Government employes should realize that the process of collec-
tive bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the
public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations when
applied to public personnel management. The very nature and purposes
of Government make it impossible for administrative officials to repre-
sent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discussions with Govern-
ment employe organizations. The employer is the whole people, who
speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress.
Accordingly, administrative officials and employes alike are governed
and guided, and in many instances restricted, by laws which establish
policies, procedures, or rules in personnel matters.'
The point of view expressed in this quotation has, with the
exception of a few recent decisions,' controlled judicial rulings
1. Letter From Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward, President
of the National Federation of Federal Employes, Aug. 16, 1937, in RHYNE,
LABOR UNIONS AND MuNIciPAL EMPLOYE LAxv 436-37 (1946). The por-
tion of that letter -quoted in text has often been quoted in judicial opinions.
E.g., State v., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 37 Cal. 2d 412, 417, 232
P-.2d 857, 860-61 (1951); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239,
1247, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542-43 (1947).
2. See Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement
& Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954); Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n
v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951); Erie County Wa-
ter Authority v. Kramer, 4 App. Div. 2d 545, 167 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1957);
New York City Transit Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d
209 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Civil Serv. Forum v. New York City Transit Author-
ity, 3 Misc. 2d 346, 151 N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1956), rev'd on other
groundsi 4 App. Div. 2d 117, 163 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1957); Christie v. Port
of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 179 P.2d 294 (1947).
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on questions of collective bargaining with public employees.' The
Minnesota Supreme Court, however, has not had the opportunity
to define the extent to which collective bargaining is permissible
in the field of public employment. But, lack of adjudication
should not obscure the fact that the legal and practical problems
in this area are pressing ones that require solution. This proposi-
tion is exemplified by the number of opinions promulgated by
the state attorney general in response to requests by various pub-
lie employers for a clarification of the issue.4 The purpose of
this Note is to ascertain the limitations, if any, on collective bar-
gaining with public employees in Minnesota, with specific em-
phasis on municipalities and school districts as public employers.
The Note will first consider the question of whether the public
employer has the general power to enter into a collective bar-
gaining agreement with employee representatives and then con-
sider the validity of specific provisions normally included in such
agreements.
I. THE GENERAL POWER OF THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYER TO ENTER INTO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
The Minnesota legislature has taken a major step toward in-
stituting collective bargaining in the field of public employment
by enacting sections 179.51 to 179.58 of the Minnesota statutes-
the so-called "no-strike" provisions.' Under section 179.52 of the
Minnesota statutes (the conference procedure section), public em-
ployees are given the right to join or to refrain from joining labor
organizations and the power to designate representatives to meet
with the public employer.' In turn, the public employer is requir-
3. See Annot. 31 A.L.R. 2d 1142, 1170-72 (1953).
4. E.g., Minn. Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D (Jan. 22, 1959); Minn. Att'y Gen.
Op. 270-D (May 10, 1957); Minn. Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D (Feb. 2,
1954); Minn. Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D (July 18, 1952); Minn. Att'y Gen. Op.
270-D (June 19, 1950); 1944 MINN. ArT'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 205
(Op. No. 115, March 29, 1943); 1940 MINN. ATr'y GEN. BIENNIAL
REP. 122 (Op. No. 92, Feb. 28, 1940); Minn. Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D
(March 23, 1939).
5. Although §§ 179.51-.58 are popularly referred to in a collective
sense as the "no-strike statute," § 179.51 is the section that prohibits pub-
lic employees from striking. The other sections of the "no-strike statute"
are at least equally as important for they provide various means of assur-
ing effective negotiation or mediation of disputes.
It should here be noted that neither the Minnesota Labor Relations
Act nor the National Labor Relations Act apply to public employment.
MINN. STAT. § 179.01(3) (1957); 61 Stat. 137-38 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 152(2), (3) (1958).
6.
Nothing contained in sections 179.51 to 179.58 shall be construed to
limit, impair or affect the right of any public employee or his or her
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ed to meet with the employee representatives to discuss "griev-
ances and conditions of employment."' In the event of a dispute
concerning the representation of the employees, the statute pro-
vides for certification of the proper representative or representa-
tives by the state labor conciliator.' "[11n order to avoid or
minimize any possible controversies," the legislature has also
enacted section 179.57 (the adjustment panel section) which pro-
vides procedures for establishing an adjustment panel to hear
grievances of public employees.9
In spite of these measures which look toward the development
of a form of collective bargaining in public employment, it is
possible that restrictive judicial interpretations of the statutes could
limit the effectiveness of this attempt. However, because the "no-
strike statute" has never been interpreted by the Minnesota Su-
preme Court, all questions must be answered by reference to the
representative to the expression or communication of a view, Fev-
ance, complaint or opinion on any matter related to the conditions
or compensation of public employment or their betterment, so long
as the same is not designed to and does not interfere with the full,
faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment; nor
shall it be construed to require any public employee to perform labor
or services against his will.
Public employees shall have the right to form and join labor organ-
izations, and shall have the right not to form and join labor organiza-
tions, public employees shall have the right to designate representa-
tives for the purpose of meeting with the governmental agency with
respect to grievances and conditions of employment. It shall be unlaw-
ful to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for the
exercise of such rights, and the governmental agency shall be required
to meet with the representatives of the employees at reasonable times
in connection with such grievances and conditions of employment It
shall be unlawful for any person or group of persons, either directly or
indirectly, to intimidate or coerce any public employee to join, or to
refrain from joining, a labor organization.
When a question concerning the representative of employees is rais-
ed by the governmental agency, labor organization, or employees, the
labor conciliator or any person designated by him shall, at the request
of any of the parties, investigate such controversy and certify to the
parties in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have
been designated or selected. In any such investigation, the labor con-
ciliator may provide for an appropriate hearing, and shall take a se-
cret ballot of employees to ascertain such representatives.
MINN. STAT. § 179.52 (1957).
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. MNN. STAT. § 179.57 (1957). Briefly described, the section provides
that public employees may request their employer to set up an "adjust-
ment panel" made up of a representative of the employees, a representa-
tive of the public employer, and a mutually satisfactory third member. The
function of the adjustment panel is to attempt to adjust grievances through
informal negotiations between the parties or, failing settlement, to afford
the parties a full hearing after which the panel makes findings to be sent to
the governor, the legislature, the public employer and the employees. The
statute does not require mandatory acceptance of the findings or manda-
tory compliance with recommendations of the panel.
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statute itself, the opinions of the state attorney general, and the
judicial opinions of other jurisdictions.
Although the conference procedure section requires the public
employer to meet with the employee representatives in connection
with "grievances and conditions of employment,"' 0 it is unclear
whether that section applies to the critical area of employee com-
pensation. It may be contended that the phrase "conditions of
employment" encompasses compensation; but this argument is
weakened by the fact that the legislature, in the preceding para-
graph of the same statutory section, used the language "any mat-
ter related to the conditions or compensation of public employ-
ment."" If the legislature had intended the phrase "conditions of
employment" to include compensation in all instances, it seems
somewhat strange that it was found necessary to use the explicit
term "compensation" in the earlier portion of the paragraph.'
However, other considerations support a conclusion that the
public employer is required to meet with employee representatives
to consider the matter of compensation. The conference procedure
section is, by its terms, not to be construed so as to "limit, impair,
or affect" the right of public employees "to the expression or com-
munication of a view, grievance, complaint or opinion on any
matter related to the conditions or compensation of public em-
ployment.' 3
If the statute were construed to mean that the public employer
is under no obligation to meet with employee representatives re-
garding compensation, the employees' right meaningfully to com-
municate their views on compensation would be adversely affect-
ed-in violation of the legislative mandate. 4
On the other hand, even if "conditions of employment" were
restrictively construed as not including compensation, the argu-
ment that the public employer is required to confer with employee
representatives on such matters is not foreclosed. It seems likely
that the term "grievances," as used in the conference procedure
section ("grievances and conditions of employment"), would be
judicially construed to include "grievances concerning matters of
10. MINN. STAT. § 179.52 (1957).
11. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
12. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 316(b) (1953). The legislature has enacted
statutes governing the construction of Minnesota statutes. Section 645.16
provides in part:
When the words of a law in their application to an existing sit-
uation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law
shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.
13. MINN. STAT. § 179.52 (1957).
14. "Nothing contained in sections 179.51 to 179.58 shall be construed
to limit, impair or affect the right of any public employee or his . . .
representative to the expression or communication of a view ... .
MINN. STAT. § 179.52 (1957).
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compensation." The probability of such a judicial construction is
heightened by the fact that the Minnesota Attorney General has
construed the term "grievance" as used in the adjustment panel
section to include alleged inadequacy of compensation.' Since
the conference procedure section and the adjustment panel section
relate to the same matter they are in pan materia, 0 and the at-
torney general's construction of the term "grievance" in the one
section would be equally applicable to the other.
Assuming that section 179.52 requires public employers to con-
fer with their employees regarding compensation and other mat-
ters commonly subject to collective negotiation, the statute stops
short of authorizing bilateral agreements that incorporate the re-
sults of such negotiations. Thus, a key question in Minnesota is
whether a public employer may enter into a collective bargaining
contract with public employee organizations if, in its discretion,
it believes a bilateral agreement would best solve personnel prob-
lems and promote greater efficiency.
While it has been suggested that if a public official has discre-
tionary power over matters of employment a collective bargain
may properly be made,' 7 a recent opinion of the Minnesota At-
torney General casts some doubt on the validity of that suggestion
under Minnesota law. The attorney general indicated that because
an administrator's discretion cannot be legally restricted by a con-
tract with an outside agency, public employers are precluded from
15. E.g., Minn. Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D (March 29, 1956); Minn.
Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D (Sept. 9, 1955); 1952 MrtN. AT'Y GEN. BiE-TNIAL
REP. 304, 305 (Op. No. 165, Nov. 15, 1951). While opinions of the attor-
ney general are not binding on the state supreme court, they have per-
suasive weight in statutory construction. 17 DuN. DIG. Statutes § 8952(3) (1955).
16. Compare MI'N. STAT. § 179.52 (1957) with MINN. STAT.§ 179.57 (1957).
For a discussion of the doctrine of in pari materia see 17 DuN. DIG.
Statutes § 8984 (1955).
17.
A collective bargain has been defined as "a statement of the conditions
upon which such work as is offered and accepted is to be done."
. ..It is said that the Administrative official cannot "bind the em-
ployer." True, his agreement would not be proof against legislative ac-
tion, for Congress could at any time change the terms of the agree-
ment. However, private contracts of a similar nature are also not com-
pletely immune from legislative action, Federal or local. The head of
each department has authority to prescribe regulations for the con-
duct of his department and the conduct of the employees. There is no
reason why such regulations cannot be made with the advice and con-
sent of the representatives of the employees. There is no lack of power
if the administrator wishes to exercise it.
It may be argued that such a regulation by contract will not be bind-
ing upon a successor. But while the ordinary rule that the decision or
contract of an administrator binds his successor is probably inapplica-
ble to this type of situation, that hardly seems a valid reason for
1960] NOTE
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entering into binding collective bargaining agreements., On the
other hand, the attorney general stated in the same opinion
that a municipality or school board "might adopt by resolution
what would otherwise be, in a private employer-employee rela-
tionship, a collective bargaining agreement." 9 The attorney gen-
eral's conclusion that collective bargaining agreements are invalid
because discretion is necessarily delegated or abdicated is a fal-
lacious over-generalization. The initial inquiry should be concern-
ed with the issue of whether the public employer possesses the
general power to contract with employee organizations. Only after
this question has been affirmatively decided should the secondary
question of what provisions may legally be incorporated in the
collective bargaining agreement become the subject for decision.
A. POWER OF THE MUNICIPALITY AS A PUBLIC EMPLOYER
1. Home rule municipalities
The fact that a given municipality operates under a home rule
charter is an important consideration in determining whether that
municipality may enter into a collective bargaining agreement with
its employees.20 Under the Minnesota constitution all cities and
villages are permitted to adopt home rule charters upon compli-
ance with procedures prescribed by statute.2' To implement this
constitutional provision, section 410.07 of the Minnesota statutes
allows such charters to "provide for any scheme of municipal gov-
ernment not inconsistent with the constitution, and [to provide]
. * . for the regulation of all local municipal functions, as fully
as the legislature might have done before home rule charters . . .
were authorized .. *"22 Thus, adoption of a home rule charter
frees the municipality from the absolute control of the Minnesota
legislature so that affairs of local concern may be handled locally
where both the problem and the interest in its solution will be
found.
The important question is whether, within the framework of
Minnesota law, home rule municipalities may by charter provision
refusing to make a contract. A collective labor agreement in private in-
dustry will not necessarily bind a purchaser or successor of the em-
ployer ...
Agger, The Government and its Employees, 47 YALE L.J. 1109, 1134-35
(1938).
18. Minn. Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D (Jan. 22, 1959). The attorney gen-
eral said that the board of education could not enter into a binding con-
tract with a union representing the employees of the school district.
19. Ibid.
20. See Seasongood & Barrow, Unionization of Public Employees, 21
U. CNc. L. REv. 327, 359 (1952).
21. MINN. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
22. MINN. STAT. § 410.07 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
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or by ordinance expressly authorize their officials to negotiate
collective bargaining agreements with public employees. Since the
state legislature unquestionably has the power expressly to author-
ize municipal officials to enter into such collective bargaining
agreements,' it should follow that a Minnesota home rule mu-
nicipality may do likewise absent other effective limitations upon
the scope of its legislative power.
Important limitations on municipal legislative power arise
where there is a conflict or inconsistency between the municipal
legislation and a state general statute,24 or where the legislature
has expressly pre-empted the area which the municipal legislation
seeks to regulate.' Formally speaking, however, traditional rules
have established other apparent limitations.
One formal limitation upon the legislative power of home rule
municipalities is derived from the terms of the home rule statute
itself: the power to regulate is limited to "regulation of all local
municipal functions . . . ." It is conceivable that an argument
could be constructed to the effect that entry into collective bargain-
ing agreements, though not in conflict with any state statute, is a
matter of more than "purely local concern" and hence beyond the
power of the municipality. 6 However, the limitation has never
been applied in that manner by the Minnesota court. Rather, the
argument that the municipal legislation "overreaches" matters of
municipal concern has been applied only in support of a conclu-
sion based upon a finding of "conflict" or inconsistency with a
state statute,27 or the scarcely distinguishable finding that the
legislature has expressly pre-empted the subject of municipal regu-
lation.' Furthermore, there is respected authority for the proposi-
23. See 56 MICH. L. REv. 645, 646-47 n.6 (1958). Two state legisla-
tures have authorized municipalities, through the proper officers, to enter
into collective bargaining agreements with the representatives of public util-
ity employees. Omo Ry. .CODE ANN. § 717.03 (Page 1954); WASHt. REV.
CODE § 35.22.350 (Supp. 1959). Another state has specifically authorized
the Metropolitan Transit Authority to enter into collective bargaining agree-
ments with its employees "concerning wages, salaries, hours, working condi-
tions and pension or retirement provisions" and to agree to settle disputes
concerning the same by binding arbitration. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 26,
§ 328a (1957).
24. E.g., State ex rel. Dann v. Hutchinson, 206 Minn. 446, 288 N.W.
845 (1939); Note, Offenses Against the City, 36 MINN. L REV. 143, 146
(1952).
25. E.g., State v. Mandehr, 168 Minn. 139, 209 N.W. 750 (1926). Conz-
pare Grant v. Berrisford, 94 Minn. 45, 101 N.W. 940 (1904), with Guaran-
teed Concrete Co. v. Garrick Bros., 185 Minn. 454, 241 N.W. 588 (1932).
26. See 2 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.83-.84 (3d
ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLIN].
27. See, e.g., Hjelm v. City of St. Cloud, 129 Minn. 240, 152 N.W. 408
(1915); State ex rel. Dann v. Hutchinson, 206 Minn. 446, 288 N.W. 845
(1939).
28. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Two Harbors, 244 Minn. 496, 70
1960]
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tion that in the absence of a finding of conflict or inconsistency
with the state's general statutes, the powers exercised by a munici-
pality pursuant to a home rule charter may properly go beyond
the bounds of purely municipal interest.2"
There are other formal grounds upon which invalidation of a
municipal ordinance may be placed. Thus, municipal legislation
must not contravene state public policy.3" Furthermore, the leg-
islature may pass general statutes relating to municipal affairs
which will be paramount to charter provisions or ordinances gov-
erning the same subject matter." However, it is questionable
whether these formally stated rules impose any limitations upon
the scope of municipal legislative power that are not effectively
imposed by the concept of "conflict" or by express pre-emption.
Thus, it is clear that municipal legislation will be found to con-
travene state public policy only where the legislature has made
that policy explicit in the statutes.32 Similarly, it is unlikely that
any state general statute which did not expressly pre-empt the area
of regulation would be found to invalidate municipal legislation
except by an analysis of the "conflict" between the municipal
legislation and the "paramount" state legislation.
No state general statute has expressly pre-empted the area of
collective bargaining agreements with public employees. There-
fore, the question becomes whether municipal legislation authoriz-
ing collective bargaining agreements with municipal employees
would conflict with Minnesota statutory law.
Conflict would be most likely to appear in evaluation of Minne-
sota statutes, sections 175.51 to 175.58-the so-called "no-
strike" statute-which provides public employees with many of
the advantages commonly associated with collective bargaining
and provides governmental facilities for the settlement of dis-
putes, avowedly for the purpose of minimizing any possible con-
troversies. 33 However, apparent compatibility may not be suffi-
cient to resolve the question of conflict.
N.W.2d 414 (1955); State v. Mandehr, 168 Minn. 139, 209 N.W. 750
(1926).
29. See 2 MCQUILLIN § 4.84, at 147.
30. E.g., State ex rel. Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252
Mnn. 526, 528-29, 91 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1958); 2 MCQUILLIN § 4.83,
at 131-41.
31. E.g., Monaghan v. Armatage, 218 Minn. 108, 112, 15 N.W.2d 241,
243-44 (1944); Guaranteed Concrete Co. v. Garrick Bros., 185 Minn.
454, 457, 241 N.W. 588, 589 (1932); State ex rel. Smith v. City of Inter-
national Falls, 132 Minn. 298, 300-01, 156 N.W. 249, 249-50 (1916);
2 McQUILLIN § 4.84.
32. E.g., Power v. Nordstrom, 150 Minn. 228, 184 N.W. 967 (1921):
see generally Anderson, Municipal Home Rule in Minnesota, 7 MINN.
L. REv. 306, 325-26 (1923).
33. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.51-.58 (1957).
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In other states which have authorized home rule charters, sever-
al cases have invalidated municipal legislation that, on its face, did
not conflict with the terms of general state legislation nor deal
with subject matter expressly pre-empted by the legislature. Thus,
in City of Golden v. Ford,3" the Colorado court was confronted
with municipal regulation of picketing more extensive than that
imposed by the state Labor Peace Act, which placed some re-
strictions on picketing and dealt with other activities relating to
labor disputes. The court held the state statute to be "sufficiently
comprehensive to embrace the entire field of regulation of dis-
putes between employers and their employees."' In another
case, Stephenson v. City of Palm Springs,6 a municipal ordinance
was invalidated on the ground that the California statutes regulat-
ing labor unions were intended to occupy the field even though
the state legislation did not expressly deal with closed shop and
union shop agreements which were prohibited by the municipality.
Essentially, these courts applied a two-step analysis to find con-
flict between the state and municipal legislation. The courts first
reasoned that by enacting legislation dealing with a particular
aspect of a given subject matter the state legislature intended to
pre-empt the entire area and preclude concurrent municipal legis-
lation. The courts then concluded that since the entire area is
pre-empted, any municipal legislation dealing with the same area is
necessarily in conflict with state legislation regardless of whether
the municipal legislation is consistent with the terms of the general
statutes. Thus, in cases such as Ford and Stephenson where the
legislatures had merely enacted several statutes dealing with par-
ticular problems within a given field of law, the judicial references
to legislative intent to pre-empt that whole field arguably represent
a judicial conclusion that the municipal legislation in question in
some manner interfered with a need for state-wide uniformity.37
However, it has been said that the Minnesota court has followed
the "liberal" view in determining what constitutes a "conflict"
between state and municipal legislation."m The decisions over-
whelmingly support that statement. For example, in the leading
34. 348 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1960).
35. Id. at 953.
36. 320 P.2d 238 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958), aff'd, 52 Cal. 2d 407, 340
P.2d 1009 (1959).
37. It has been suggested that legislative intent to pre-empt the area of
regulation, in absence of contrary indication in the state statute, may be as-
sumed to exist only to the extent necessary to invalidate any ordinance
or home rule charter provision which substantially interferes with the
effective functioning of that state statute. See Note, Conflicts Between
State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HsIv. L. REv. 737, 745(1959).
. 38. Note, Offenses Against the City, 36 MniN. L. REv. 143, 146-47(1952).
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case of Grant v. Berrisford,39 action was brought on a contrac-
tor's bond without the notice required by a general state statute.
The action was brought under a provision of the municipality's
home rule charter which covered the matter but did not require
notice as did the general statute. In response to a plea that the
charter provision was invalid as conflicting with the general state
law, the supreme court stated:
This presents the question whether the charter provisions relating
to contractors' bonds are in harmony with and subject to the constitu-
tion and laws of the state, as required by constitutional amendment.
If this limitation on the power of cities in framing their charters is
to be construed as prohibiting the adoption of any charter provisions
relating to proper subjects of municipal legislation and matters ger-
mane thereto, unless they are similar to and contain all the provisions
of the general laws on the subject, then, as said by the learned trial
judge: "All that the framers of a charter can do, where there is a law
in existence at the time the charter is adopted, is to add such provisions
as are not already contained in the law, and are not repugnant to it.
If this is the extent of the power conferred upon cities to make their
own charters, then the constitutional grant is a mere form of words, of
no practical value." It is clear that such is not a proper construction of
the limitation. This limitation forbids the adoption of any charter pro-
visions contrary to the public policy of the state, as declared by gen-
eral laws . . . . But it does not forbid the adoption of charter
provisions as to any subject appropriate to the orderly conduct of mu-
nicipal affairs, although they may differ in details from those of exist-
ing general laws.40
Subsequently, in American Elec. Co. v. City of Waseca4 the
court amplified its statement in Grant, saying:
We have held in recent cases that the provisions of home rule charters
upon all subjects proper for municipal regulation prevail over the Gen-
eral Statutes relating to the same subject-matter, except in those cases
where the charter contravenes the public policy of the state...
and in those instances where the Legislature expressly declares that a
general law shall prevail, or a purpose that it shall so prevail appears
by fair implication, taking into consideration the subject and the gen-
eral nature of the charter and general statutory provisions. 42
In the light of such decisions, it is inconceivable that the Minne-
sota Supreme Court would find that the "no-strike" statute had
pre-empted the field so completely as to render conflicting, and
thus invalid, home rule legislation authorizing collective bargain-
ing agreements between public employers and employees.4 3
39. 94 Minn. 45, 101 N.W. 940 (1904).
40. Id. at 47-48, 101 N.W. at 941-42.
41. 102 Minn. 329, 113 N.W. 899 (1907).
42. Id. at 333-34, 113 N.W. at 901.
43. The Minnesota legislature may have intended to afford uniform
treatment as to the general rights and privileges of public employees, but it
[Vol. 45:249
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2. Municipalities Which Have Not Adopted Home Rule Chart-
ers
Suppose a Minnesota municipality operates under a statutory
charter rather than a home rule charter and that the municipality
has no charter provision that expressly authorizes collective bar-
gaining with municipal employees. In such a case, if any authority
to bargain collectively exists, it must be found by construing the
municipality's general statutory powers." Of course, if the char-
ter says that matters of public employment may only be governed
by rule or regulation, a collective bargaining agreement covering
terms and conditions of employment is prohibited. However, where
the municipality's charter is silent as to how terms and conditions
of employment are to be settled, it is probable that the power to
enter into collective bargaining agreements covering such terms
may be implied from the express powers.
Courts apply a rule of strict construction when the extent of
municipal power under a statutory charter is at issue; that is, any
doubt will be resolved against the existence or expansion of the
power.45 Thus, in Minnesota it is well-settled that a municipality
is difficult to argue that the legislature also intended that the means of
formalizing the results of collective negotiation be uniform. As a matter
of fact, it appears doubtful that the legislature intended that even the gen-
eral rights and privileges of the public employee should be subject to uni-
form regulation. The Minnesota legislature has placed the adoption of
civil service on a voluntary rather than a mandatory basis for municipalities
of the second, third, and fourth class. MINN. STAT. § 44.02 (1957). Since
there is no express or implied legislative mandate for pre-emption, mu-
nicipal legislation authorizing collective bargaining agreements with public
employees should be sustained on the ground that no Minnesota statute has
forbidden such action.
44. See Minn. Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D (July 18, 1952) ("The authority of
a city to contract must be found either in its charter or the laws of the
State of Minnesota.").
45. E.g., Long v. City of Duluth, 49 Minn. 280, 51 N.W. 913 (1892);
RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAw § 4-12 (1957); RHYNE, MUNICIPAL CON-
TRACTS 28 (1952).
The rule of strict construction is equally applicable in a determination
of the powers of a home rule municipality. See 2 MCQUILLIN § 10.25.
Thus, absence of an explicit provision covering collective bargaining agree-
ments from the home rule charter would seemingly be fatal to an assertion
of the power to bargain collectively. However, the home rule charter may
provide a basis for application of a liberal construction by including an
"all powers" provision. Briefly, these provisions are designed to grant to
the municipality all powers possible under the state constitution, statutes, or
otherwise by use of a general provision rather than elaborate enumeration
of specific powers. For an example of such a provision see State ex rel.
Zien v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 355, 359-60, 159 N.W. 792, 794 (1916).
Such a provision has been construed as tantamount to a general welfare
clause. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Weinberg, 53 F. Supp. 133 (D. Minn. 1943);
City of Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 16 N.W.2d 779 (1944); State
ex rel. Zien v. City of Duluth, supra; 2 McQuiLLN § 10.25; see Park v.
City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 159 N.W. 627 (1916); see generally RHYNE,
MUImcIPAL LAW § 4-8 (1957). And, general welfare clauses have been
1960]
MINNESOTA LA W REVIEW
has no inherent power.4" Rather, a municipality possesses only
those powers that have been expressly granted and those that
may be necessarily implied from the express powers.47 In the law
of municipal powers generally, courts have followed one of two
liberally construed to allow a city to exercise broad powers of regulation
inasmuch as they include all powers which may be given to and exercised
by municipal corporations. City of Duluth v. Cerveny, supra; Tousley v.
Leach, 180 Minn. 293, 230 N.W. 788 (1930); State ex rel. Zien v. City of
Duluth, supra; see Northern Pac. Ry. v. Weinberg, supra. Therefore, the
general welfare clause of municipal charters would appear to be a likely
source of the power to execute collective bargaining agreements.
Moreover, when a municipal corporation acts in its "proprietary" capac-
ity the rule of strict construction is not applied. 2 MCQUILLIN § 10.22;
Comment, Union Labor and the Municipal Employer, 45 ILL. L. REv. 364,
368-69 (1951); see Wilke v. City of Duluth, 172 Minn. 374, 215 N.W.
511 (1927). Minnesota case law seems to accord with this view for there
is language in several decisions to the effect that when a municipality
is acting in its proprietary capacity the rules of contract law applicable
to transactions between individuals control. See e.g., City of Crookston v.
Crookston Water Works, Power & Light Co., 150 Minn. 347, 353, 185
N.W. 380, 382 (1921); Reed v. City of Anoka, 85 Minn. 294, 298, 88
N.W. 981, 982 (1902). It has been suggested that the power to bargain
collectively with public employees could be implied as easily as those
powers which courts have been willing to imply in the past even if the
judicial language in reference to proprietary capacity is taken with
a grain of salt. Comment, Union Labor and the Municipal Employer, supra
at 369. However, the courts have thus far refused to expressly apply the
governmental-proprietary distinction to allow collective bargaining with
public employees. In fact, some courts have expressly rejected the concept
as wholly inapplicable to collective bargaining with public employees. City
of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1252, 206 S.W.2d 539, 546
(1947); City of Alcoa v. IBEW, 203 Tenn. (7 McCanless) 12, 23-25, 308
S.W.2d 476, 481-82 (1957); Weakley County Municipal Elec. Sys. v. Vick,
309 S.W.2d 792, 801-05 (Tenn. App. 1957), cert. denied (Tenn. 1958);
56 MIcH. L. REV. 645, 646 n.5 (1958); see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d
1142, 1165 (1953). However, in upholding a collective bargaining agree-
ment entered into by a municipal authority, although the decision was
not expressly based on the point, the Washington court noted that the
authority engaged in "purely proprietary undertakings." Christie v. Port
of Olympia, 27 Wash. 2d 534, 547-48, 179 P.2d 294, 301 (1947). And,
the Arizona court noted the fact that a proprietary function was involved
as one factor in its finding that there was authority to enter into a col-
lective bargaining agreement with public employees. Local 266, IBEW v.
Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30,
39, 275 P.2d 393, 399 (1954).
The purpose of making the legalistic distinction between governmental
and proprietary functions is to determine what powers can be implied. See
Comment, Union Labor and the Municipal Employer, supra at 369. Still,
the distinction seems to have no relevance to the policy factors upon which
the ultimate decision should rest. And, there is no established rule by
which the distinction may consistently be made. See RHYNE, MUNICIPAL
LAW § 4-6 (1957); see generally Seasongood, Municipal Corporations:
Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REv. 910
(1936).
46. State ex rel. Village of Fridley v. City of Columbia Heights, 237
Minn. 124, 130, 53 N.W.2d 831, 835 (1952).
47. Ibid.
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prevailing views.48 Under the conservative view, a power may
not be implied unless it is so essential or indispensable to the
exercise of an expressly conferred power as to clearly indicate a
legislative intent that the power be implied.4 9 Other courts, fol-
lowing the more liberal view, hold that a power may be implied
even though it is not absolutely indispensable if it is an aid to the
more complete exercise of an express power.50
The Minnesota Supreme Court's approach to the implied pow-
ers question is ambiguous and cannot be assigned with certainty
to either the liberal or conservative category. In a recent decision,
State ex rel. Village of Fridley v. City of Columbia Heights,"1
the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that a municipality has
powers which "may be necessarily implied from those expressly
conferred." 2 The court did not, however, adhere to a strict
necessity test. Instead, the decision was based primarily on the
ground that it would be both unjust and unreasonable to find
implied power in one municipality to annex land entirely within
the boundaries of another municipality. Moreover, in its earlier
decisions, the Minnesota court reached results inconsistent with the
conservative approach to implied powers. In Williams v. Village
of Kenyon,53 the supreme court held that the power to enter into
48. See RHYNE, MuNIcIPAL Lw § 4-7 (1957). Apparently both of
these supposedly conflicting views were derived from "Dillon's Rule" which
has been stated as follows:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no
others: first, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily
or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and pur-
poses of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensiblc.
Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the exercise of
power is resolved by the courts against the corporation and the power
is denied.
Quoted in Serbine, Municipal Powers, 24 MINN. STAT. ANN. 73, 78-79(1958). Judge John F. Dillon was the author of a text on municipal cor-
porations and the formulator of "Dillon's Rule." This rule was first enun-
ciated in 1872 and, according to the commentator, may be considered to
be an accurate statement of present-day law. The second of the classes
of powers mentioned in the rule has been freely used recently to enable
municipalities to cope with rapidly changing conditions of population and
scientific advance. Ibid.
49. See, e.g., Stoner McCray Sys. v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa
1313, 1322, 78 N.W.2d 843, 849 (1956); People ex rel. City of Olean v.
Western N. Y. & Pa. Traction Co., 214 N.Y. 526, 529, 108 N.E. 847,
848 (1915); RHYNE, MtmrciPAL LAW § 4-7 (1957).
50. See, e.g., Colwell v. City of Waterbury, 74 Conn. 568, 51 Ad. 530(1902); People ex rel. Sweitzer v. City of Chicago, 363 Ill. 409, 2 N.E.2d
330 (1936); Potson v. City of Chicago, 304 11. 222, 136 N.E. 594 (1922);
Schneider v. City of Menasha, 118 Wis. 298, 95 N.W. 94 (1903).
51. 237 Minn. 124, 53 N.W.2d 831 (1952).
52. Id. at 130, 53 N.W.2d at 835.
53. 187 Minn. 161, 244 N.W. 558 (1932).
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a conditional sales contract for the purchase of generating equip-
ment could be implied as "reasonably necessary" to the express
power to erect a lighting and heating plant. And, although the
court said in State ex rel. Johnson v. Brown 4 that it was applying
a rule of "reasonably strict construction," the result demonstrates
that the court in fact employed the liberal approach. In the Brown
case, the charter provision giving the Minneapolis board of park
commissioners the power to "hold, improve, govern and adminis-
ter" parks and parkways was construed impliedly to authorize the
board to erect a dwelling house on park property to be used as a
residence for the park superintendent and his family.
In light of such decisions it is reasonable to conclude that in
Minnesota a power will be implied in aid of an express power
when policy considerations do not militate against the existence of
such power and it may be implied without an extremely tortuous
construction. Specifically, it should be possible for the Minnesota
Supreme Court to imply the power to enter into collective bargain-
ing agreements with public employees from the municipality's ex-
pressly granted general power to contract.5 5 One court has rea-
soned that if the municipality is authorized to enter into many
individual contracts of employment, it would be incongruous to
deny it the power to enter into a single agreement concerning
the terms and conditions of employment of a number of the em-
ployees. 6 It has also been argued that the power to achieve
harmonious labor relations by means of collective bargaining
agreements with municipal employees must necessarily be implied
in or incident to a municipality's powers to employ and to ad-
minister its affairs. Harmonious labor relations are of great impor-
tance if the municipality is to serve its inhabitants in the most
efficient manner. 7
However, where the municipal charter contains an express pro-
vision authorizing the municipality to contract in regard to em-
ployment it may be unnecessary to imply the power to enter into a
collective bargaining agreement. The Minnesota Supreme Court
has ruled that:
Where municipal authorities are authorized to contract in relation to
a particular matter, they have a discretion, as to methods and terms,
with the honest and reasonable exercise of which a court cannot in-
54. 111 Minn. 80, 126 N.W. 408 (1910).
55. "[T]he inhabitants shall . . . be a body politic . . . [and] shall
• . . be capable of contracting and being contracted with . . . ." MINN.
STAT. § 411.02 (1957). See e.g., Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project
Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 38-39, 275 P.2d
393, 398-99 (1954).
56. Id. at 39, 275 P.2d at 399.
57. PRESSMAN, LEGAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF POWER OF MU-
NICIPALITIES TO ENTER INTO COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 12-13 (1942).
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terfere, although they may not have chosen the best method, or
made the most advantageous contracts
Thus, if responsible municipal officials believe that a collective
bargaining agreement is the most effective means of achieving
good labor relations with municipal employees, the Minnesota
court could not invalidate such a bargaining agreement without
overruling or disregarding prior law.
B. POWER OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT AS A PUBLIC EMPLOYER
The school boards of common and independent school districts
in Minnesota are by statute expressly granted the power to "em-
ploy and contract with necessary qualified teachers and discharge
the same for cause."99 However, the Minnesota Attorney General
has declined to issue an opinion stating flatly that a school board
possesses the general power to enter into collective bargaining
agreements with the representatives of teachers' organizations."
The attorney general has gone no further than to say that proper
proposals of a teacher, union, or other organization with regard
to subjects which, in private employment, would be proper sub-
jects for collective bargaining may be incorporated in a school
board's rules, regulations or resolutions.61
Nevertheless, there is general authority to the effect that school
boards may enter collective bargaining agreements. In Norwalk
Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ.62 the Connecticut court found
that implied authority to negotiate such an agreement with a teach-
ers' organization was incident to the school board's broad powers
over educational matters and school management. Since the Minne-
sota legislature has not prescribed any particular method of for-
malizing employment contracts and no statute or court decision has
indicated that the school board's discretion cannot be exercised by
means of a collective bargaining agreement, the Norwalk result
seems equally possible in Minnesota.
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that
public school administrative officers have broad powers to deter-
58. Flynn v. Little Falls Elect. & Water Co., 74 Minn. 180, 186, 77
N.W. 38, 39 (1898), affd on reargument, 74 Minn. 191, 78 N.W. 106(1899) (Mitchell, J.). (Emphasis added.) Also see Davies v. Village of
Madelia, 205 Minn. 526, 287 N.W. 1 (1939); Ambrozich v. City of Eveleth,
200 Minn. 473, 274 N.W. 635 (1937); Reed v. City of Anoka, 85 Minn.
294, 88 N.W. 981 (1902).
59. MINN. SrAT. ANN. §§ 123.14(4), .35(5) (1960). The school board
is also given general charge of the business of the school district. MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 123.14(1), .35(1) (1960). Thus, the school board exercises
all powers granted to the school district.
60. See, e.g., Minn. Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D (Jan. 22, 1959); Minn. Att'y
Gen. Op. 270-D (Jan. 31, 1947).
61. See, e.g., authorities cited at note 60 supra.
62. 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951).
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mine matters of policy pursuant to the boards' administrative,
legislative, and executive functions and that the courts can exer-
cise little control in this area.63 For instance, terms of employ-
ment contracts, including the fixing of salaries, have been held to
be within the discretion of the school board. 4 Thus, if a school
board should determine that the solution to its problems of per-
sonnel management could more feasibly be accomplished by ex-
ecuting a collective bargaining agreement with its employees, prior
authority indicates that such action should be upheld. Such a de-
termination seems clearly to be a policy matter relating to the
administration of school affairs. Because school boards have the
expressly granted power to contract for employment with teachers,
their exercise of discretion should not be subject to general review
by the courts unless a board acts in an arbitrary or capricious
manner.
6 5
II. THE VALIDITY OF SPECIFIC TERMS OF THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Although the public employer in Minnesota has the power to
enter into collective bargaining agreements, such power may be il-
lusory without the correlative power to incorporate into the con-
tract provisions normally included in corresponding agreements
in private industry. The objections traditionally raised against the
collective bargaining agreement and specific provisions thereof are
that an unlawful delegation or abdication of discretion occurs or
that agreement to certain specific terms constitutes an illegal dis-
crimination by the public employer.
A. DISCRETIONARY POWERS: THE EFFECT OF DELEGATION OR
ABDICATION
The rule is well-established that a public official's discretionary
powers are held by him in public trust and thus may not be dele-
63. Frisk v. Board of Educ., 246 Minn. 366, 381, 75 N.W.2d 504, 514
(1956); see State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 589, 7
N.W.2d 544, 564 (1942).
64. Frisk v. Board of Educ., supra note 63, at 382, 75 N.W.2d at
514. Provided the school board has been given the power to contract with
reference to a particular matter, it is free to exercise honest and reasonable
discretion as to "methods and terms" and the courts may not interfere
with the exercise of that discretion even though the board may not
have chosen the best method or made the most advantageous contract.
Ketterer v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 248 Minn. 212, 224, 79
N.W.2d 428, 437 (1956).
65. See Frisk v. Board of Educ., 246 Minn. 366, 382, 75 N.W.2d 504,
514 (1956). The power to contract with teachers is granted in the follow-
ing terms: "The board shall employ and contract with necessary qualified
teachers and discharge the same for cause .... ." MINN. STAT. § 123.14
(4) (1957).
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gated. 6 However, the critical question is whether the inclusion
within the collective bargaining agreement of a provision govern-
ing an area with respect to which the public official has discre-
tionary power constitutes a delegation. Whenever a public official
determines what specific terms will be included within an individ-
ual employment contract, the official has exercised rather than del-
egated his discretion over the terms included in the contract. Simi-
larly, when the public official agrees to the inclusion of specific
terms within a collective bargaining agreement governing the terms
of employment of many individuals, discretion is exercised rather
than delegated." A delegation of discretion will only occur
where the terms of the agreement leave certain matters to be de-
termined by an outside agency.6
In the case of the collective bargaining agreement, a more im-
portant question than delegation of discretion is whether the pub-
lic official has abdicated his continuing discretion as to those terms
bargained upon; and if so, whether such an abdication is objec-
tionable. 9 The argument that discretion has not been abdicated
because the public official has the choice of whether or not to en-
ter into the agreement70 is misconceived, for the real objection is
that continuing discretion has been abdicated.'
66. 34 MwNm. L. Rxv. 260, 264-65 (1950); see Note, Union Activity in
Public Employment, 55 COLUM. L. Rnv. 343, 350 (1955); Note, Right of
Municipality to Enter Into Collective Bargaining Agreement on Behalf of
Civil Service Employees, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 247, 259-60 (1941). But
see Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 278-80,
83 A.2d 482, 486-87 (1951).
67. See Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improve-
ment & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 39, 275 P.2d 393, 399 (1954).
68. See, e.g., Jewell Belting Co. v. Village of Bertha, 91 Minn. 9, 97
N.W. 424 (1903); 1944 MiN. ATrY GEN. BIENNrAL REP. 265 (Op.
No. 156, Oct. 23, 1943).
69. The assertion has been made that "the City authorities cannot
delegate or abdicate their continuing discretion. Any exercise of such
discretion by the establishment of hours, wages or working conditions is
at all times subject to change or revocation in the exercise of that same
discretion." Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, 185 Md. 266, 270, 44
A.2d 745, 747 (1945).
70. This argument was used by the court to sustain a collective bargain-
ing agreement with public employees in Local 266, IBEW v. Salt River
Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 39, 275
P.2d 393, 399 (1954). It may be noted that in Minnesota the public em-
ployer is under no obligation to bargain collectively. Although he is under
an obligation to meet with employee representatives to discuss terms and
conditions of employment, see MINN. STAT. § 179.52 (1957), there is no
sanction equivalent to that under federal law which proscribes as an unfair
labor practice a private employer's refusal to bargain in good faith with
his employees' representatives. See, e.g., Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good
Faith, 71 HARv. L. Rnv. 1401 (1958); Comment, Requirement Under the
Taft-Hartley Act to Bargain in Good Faith, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 220 (Fall
1960).
71: See City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades
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Strictly speaking, the public official abdicates his continuing dis-
cretion over matters governed by provisions of the collective bar-
gaining agreement for the period of time that the agreement is in
force. However, the same is true as to any terms that are incor-
porated into an individual contract of employment. Furthermore,
the idea that public officials at any time exercise "continuing
discretion" has more basis in theory than in fact. For example, as-
sume that the public official has discretion to fix compensation
schedules. The accepted method of exercising discretionary power
is through the promulgation of rules, regulations, and resolutions
which may be rescinded at any time.72 Thus, continuing discre-
tion is theoretically never surrendered. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the right of rescission would not be exercised for a substan-
tial period of time, for an intelligent public official would normally
try to plan changes in the compensation schedules in a manner
that would have the least detrimental effect on the working force.
Therefore, even though the public official exercises his discretion
without formally surrendering his discretion, he must, as a matter
of administrative necessity, surrender his continuing discretion
for a reasonable period of time. If a collective bargaining agree-
ment similarly extends for a reasonable period,73 it does not dif-
Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 47, 210 P.2d 305, 311-12 (1949); Mugford
v. Mayor & City Council, 185 Md. 266, 270, 44 A.2d 745, 747 (1945);
City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1247-51, 206 S.W.2d 539,
543-45 (1947).
Since usual legislative grants of power have been found impliedly to
authorize administrators to enter into binding contracts outside the area of
collective bargaining, it would seem that the power to enter into binding
collective bargaining agreements could be implied with equal facility. If
discretion may validly be surrendered in the first instance, implied authori-
zation to surrender a limited amount of continuing discretion under the
collective bargaining agreement should be found by analogy. See 10 Mc-
QUILLIN § 29.05; Note, Union Activity in Public Employment, 55 COLUM.
L. REV. 343, 351 (1955); 56 MicH. L. REv. 645, 648 (1958). However.
the analogy may be misleading. In certain areas the existent legislative
intent that discretion should be surrendered by contract must necessarily
be implied by the nature of the legislation. See Reed v. City of Anoka, 85
Minn. 294, 298, 88 N.W. 981, 982 (1902). On the other hand, such a leg-
islative intention does not necessarily follow as to the power of an adminis-
trator to make decisions of a legislative nature relating to the terms and
conditions of employment. Thus, it has been suggested that each question
must depend primarily upon statutory intent and not on mere analogy. See
Shestack, The Public Employee and His Government: Conditions and Dis-
abilities of Public Employment, 8 VAND. L. Rnv. 816, 835 (1955).
72. See, e.g., 1944 MINN. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 265 (Op. No.
156, Oct. 23, 1943).
73. All municipal contracts must be limited in duration to the time that
is reasonable in light of the necessities presented by the subject matter.
See Flynn v. Little Falls Elect. & Water Co., 74 Minn. 180, 77 N.W. 38(1898), affd on reargument, 74 Minn. 191, 78 N.W. 106 (1899). A col-
lective bargaining agreement is likely to be of short duration due to unions'
desire to bargain periodically to receive further favorable changes in terms
266 (Vol. 45:249
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fer significantly from a rule, regulation, or resolution except that
continuing discretion is legally surrendered rather than surrendered
as a pragmatic necessity. However, it is difficult to see how the
surrender of discretion involved in a collective bargaining agree-
ment differs in substance from the surrender of discretion involv-
ed in every individual contract of employment. Thus, it would
seem that the proper judicial approach would be to determine
whether, considering the subject matter governed by the collective
bargaining agreement, the length of time that discretion is surren-
dered is reasonable.74
B. AaIBITRATION OF DISPUTES
Courts have generally reacted unfavorably to provisions in col-
lective bargaining agreements which require that disputes between
public employees and their employer be settled by arbitration.7 5
The grounds on which the Courts have invalidated such provisions
are: (1) that the agreement to submit disputed matters to a third-
party arbitrator who shall make a binding decision is an illegal
delegation of discretion; and (2) that the handling of all disputes
by arbitration is contrary to the civil service or merit system
law.76
and conditions of employment. There are other considerations that tend
to restrict the duration of collective bargaining agreements. Any agreement
concerning compensation may be valid only for the length of the budgetary
period of the public employer who cannot be bound beyond the amount
of the funds appropriated. Also, it may be undesirable to bind successors
in the case of collective bargaining agreements where there is no necessity
comparable to that present in the case of contracts which by their very
nature cannot be performed during the term of office of the contracting
employer.
74. See Seasongood & Barrow, Unionization of Public Employees, 21
U. CiNc. L. Rnv. 327, 367-68 (1952).
75. See Annot., 31 A.LR.2d 1142, 1172-74 (1953); Vogel, What About
the Rights of the Public Employee?, 1 LAD. L.J 604, 610-12 (1950).
76. Mann v. Richardson, 66 Ill. 481 (1873) (delegation of discretion);
Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945)(conflicts with civil service or merit system law); City of Cleveland v.
Division 268, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach
Employees of America, 30 Ohio Op. 395 (C.P. 1945) (delegation of discre-
tion and conflicts with civil service or merit system law). In the Cleveland
case the court said:
Under the civil service laws of the state and city, it would seem a
vain and futile thing for the transit board to refer the issues to arbi-
trators who, with the best of intentions, but in ignorance of the civil
service laws, might make an award which it would be legally impossible
for the transit board to accept.
In view of the overwhelming weight of authority the court holds
that, assuming the board has power to enter into a contract with a
union or association of employees, a provision for compulsory arbitra-
tion would be illegal.
Id. at 410.
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While no case has been decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court
regarding arbitration agreements with public employees, the Min-
nesota Attorney General has issued opinions concerning the prob-
lem. The attorney general has said that an unqualified arbitra-
tion provision in an agreement between the University of Minneso-
ta and the Public Building Service Employees Union was invalid
because it would have resulted in the relinquishment of powers
and duties conferred by law upon the Board of Regents. 77 In his
opinion, the attorney general did not discuss the question of wheth-
er arbitration was a method which might properly have limited
application to public employment in the settlement of particular
disputes. Subsequent to the issuing of that opinion, the Minnesota
legislature enacted the adjustment panel section78 which author-
ized non-binding, mediation-type procedures."9 It may be argued
that by enacting this section the legislature provided the sole
remedy for the settlement of disputes with public employees and
divested the public employer of any power he possessed to agree
to arbitrate even specific, arbitrable disputes."0 However, the ar-
gument is equally persuasive that enactment of the adjustment
panel section did not, by implication or otherwise, divest the public
employer of the power to agree to arbitrate particular disputes if
such power in fact existed prior to the enactment. It would seem
that in the absence of explicit denial of the power to agree to ar-
bitrate a specific, arbitrable dispute, the better view would favor the
power of the public employer to adopt whatever appears to be
the most practical form of settling specific disputes-including
arbitration.
The proposition that public employers have at least limited, in-
herent power to enter into arbitration agreements with their em-
77. 1944 MINN. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 265 (Op. No. 156, Oct.
23, 1943); see also id. at 263 (Op. No. 155, March 29, 1943).
78. MINN. STAT. § 179.57 (1957); see note 9 supra.
79. Minn. Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D (Aug. 12, 1958). Inasmuch as the
adjustment panel section does not actually state the legal effect of the
panel's findings, there was some question whether the findings were legally
binding on the governmental agency and employees involved. According
to the attorney general's construction of the statute, the panel findings
are not binding on either side.
80. See Gaidamavice v. Newaygo Board of County Road Comm'rs, 341
Mich. 280, 288-89, 67 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1954), where the court said
that the public employee's remedy of processing his grievance before the
labor mediation board was exclusive under the Michigan "anti-strike stat-
ute." The Minnesota Attorney General has filed an opinion stating that the
Minnesota "no-strike statute" was patterned upon and identical to the
Michigan statute in question in Gaidamavice, with the exception that the
Minnesota statute provides for mediation by an adjustment panel rather
than by the labor mediation board. Minn. Att'y Gen. Op. 270-D (Jan.
22, 1959).
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iloyees l has recently been judicially recognized. In Norwalk
Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ.82 the Connecticut court held
that there was no reason to deny the board of education the power
to enter voluntarily into a contract to arbitrate a specific dispute.
However, the court also stated that an unlimited agreement to sub-
mit all disputes to arbitration would be invalid. The Norwalk
distinction is sound. At least where the subject matter of a dispute
is governed by statute or ordinance, such as civil service or merit
system provisions, the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration.'
Similarly, where substantial questions of policy are at the heart of
the dispute, an agreement to arbitrate would clearly result in
delegation of legislative discretion to an outside agency.98 Even if
the arbitration provision incorporated into the collective bargain-
ing agreement were limited to proper subjects for arbitration, the
objection that continuing discretion has been surrendered seems
valid.' On the other hand, if the public employer makes an ad
hoc decision that an arbitrable dispute should be submitted to
binding arbitration by an outside agency, discretion has been prop-
erly exercised."6 Consistent with the preceding analysis, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that although the public employer in Minne-
sota does not have the power to agree to a clause in the collective
bargaining agreement submitting all disputes to arbitration, he may
enter into an individual agreement to submit a specific, arbitrable
dispute to arbitration.
C. DISCRIMINATION
In some cases, collective bargaining agreements with public em-
ployers have been invalidated on the ground that a particular pro-
vision in the agreement discriminates against public employees
who do not belong to the contracting organization.' However, in-
81. A noted authority on municipal law has said that municipalities have
the inherent power to arbitrate disputes arising out of subject matter with
regard to which they have the general power to contract. RnYNE, MuNt-
ciPAL LAw § 31-8, at 803-04 (1957).
82. 138 Conn. 269, 279, 83 A.2d 482, 487 (1951).
83. Cf. Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, 185 Md. 266, 270, 44 A.2d
745, 747 (1945).
84. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 279,
83 A.2d 482, 487 (1951).
85. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
86. Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 279,
83 A.2d 482, 487 (1951).
87. E.g., City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America, 30 Ohio Op.
395, 407 (C.P. 1945) (exclusive bargaining agent). In Mugford v. Mayor &
City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945) (dues check off), the
court stated:
It has been frequently held that a municipality, in performing work
or other duties it is required by law to do, cannot discriminate in favor
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validation has not been based on the theory that discrimination
affects the general power to enter into the collective bargaining
agreement,ss but rather on the ground that the illegal provision
could not be severed from the rest of the agreement. 9 Since sev-
eral specific provisions have been frequently invalidated as dis-
criminatory it is necessary to determine the status of such provisions
under Minnesota law.
1. Closed Shop or Union Shop Provisions
In Norwalk the Connecticut court stated that an agreement by
the public employer "to hire only union members would clearly be
an illegal discrimination."9 To support this proposition the court
relied solely upon common law authority from other jurisdictions.9"
The Minnesota legislature, however, has declared that in the area
of public employment closed shop or union shop provisions are
illegally discriminatory. The conference procedure section of the
Minnesota statutes provides in part that:
Public employees shall have the right to form and join labor organ-
izations, and shall have the right not to form and join labor organ-
izations . . . . It shall be unlawful to discharge or otherwise dis-
criminate against an employee for the exercise of such rights ....
of members of a labor union. Such action would not only be unlawful
but would also tend to constitute a monopoly of public service by
members of a labor union, which the law does not countenance. By
the same force of reasoning a citizen who is a member of a union
cannot, by that fact alone, be barred from a position in the public
service.
Id. at 270, 44 A.2d at 747. Along this same line, in Chapin v. Board
of Educ., No. 21255, Cir. Ct. Ill., Dec. 9, 1939 (closed shop), in RHYNE,
LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAW 157 (1946), the court
stated that:
It would not be contended that the legislature of our State could
pass a law providing that certain work required by the State or by a
board of education should be done only by members of a particular
organization. Such a law would be unconstitutional and void on the
ground of discrimination. So, a school board, an agency and creature
of the State, which could have no more authority in this regard than
the State itself, cannot enter into a contract of the nature of the one
involved in this case except under the penalty of it being illegal and
void for the same reason. It may be true that without any contract
the board can employ members of the local in question to the cxclu-
sion of non-members. It may be within its discretion to do so. The
board cannot, however, by contract, foreclose the possibility of a
non-member securing employment.
Id. at 158.
88. See Comment, Union Labor and the Municipal Employer, 45 ILL.
L. REv. 364, 372 (1950).
89. See RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAW 35
(1946).
90. 138 Conn. 269, 278, 83 A.2d 482, 486 (1951).
91. Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, 185 Md. 266, 270, 44 A.2d
745, 747 (1945); cases cited and reprinted in RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAW 34, 137, 157 (1946).
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It shall be unlawful for any person or group of persons, either directly
or indirectly, to intimidate or coerce any public employee to join or
to refrain from joining, a labor organization. 92
This statute leaves no doubt that closed shop and union shop pro-
visions are invalid and may not be used in any form in Minnesota
where public employees are involved.
2. Dues Check Off Provisions
An agreement whereby the employer deducts union dues from
his-employees' wages and remits the amount deducted to the union
is commonly referred to as a check off provision. 3 In Mug!ord
v. Mayor & City Council" the Maryland Court of Appeals held
that the city of Baltimore had the power to check off union dues
provided: (1) that the request for cheek off came from an in-
dividual employee rather than as a blanket demand from the union;
(2) that the privilege of check off was open to all employees
alike; and (3) that the employees requesting check off had the
right to discontinue such payments at any time. On the other hand,
compulsory check off provisions have been condemned as dis-
criminatory on the ground that such provisions tend to establish a
closed shop. 5
Although Minnesota law provides that public employees have
the same rights to assign their wages as private employees, 9 a
compulsory check off provision would probably be invalid under
the wage assignment statute."' That statute voids all assignments
of wages to be earned, more than sixty days from the date of as-
signment except payroll deductions for union dues, which are ex-
cepted in the following terms: "A written contract may be enter-
d into between an employer and an employee wherein the em-
ployee authorizes the employer to make payroll deductions for the
purpose of paying union dues . . . for periods longer than 60
days." ' The statutory language is ambiguous in that the "written
92. MINN. STAT. § 179.52 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
93. See RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE LAw 38(1946).
94. 185 Md. 266, 272, 44 A.2d 745, 747-48 (1945).
95. Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, Baltimore City Cir. Ct. No. 2,
April 12, 1944, in RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYE
LAw 161, 163 (1946). Check off provisions raise additional problems. For
example, a municipal corporation cannot, in absence of statutory authoriza-
tion, become an agency for the collection of private debts. See Merwin
v. City of Chicago, 45 111. 133, 136 (1867). Also, state statutes often
govern and restrict Wage assignments. See, e.g., OIo Ruv. CODE ANN.
§ 1321.32 (Page Supp. 1960); Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St.
313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947); compare State ex rel. Leach v. Price, 168
Ohio St. 499, 156 N.E.2d 316 (1959).
96. MINN. STAT. § 181.063 (1957).
97. MINN. STAT. § 181.06 (1957).
98. Ibid.
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contract" referred to could be interpreted as including a collec-
tive bargaining agreement providing for compulsory check off of
dues.99 However, since compulsory check off provisions are gen-
erally condemned,' it is unlikely that the Minnesota legislature
contemplated that the statute would be so construed.
If the public employer agreed with the union to check off dues
for those employees furnishing the requisite authorization, such
action would clearly be consistent with the wage assignment stat-
ute. Therefore, the public employer in Minnesota may agree to the
inclusion of voluntary check off provisions in the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
3. Exclusive Bargaining Agent
Several decisions in jurisdictions other than Minnesota have in-
dicated that it would be an unlawful discrimination for a public
employer to agree that one union shall be the exclusive bargaining
agent for its employees.' However, it does not appear likely that
such a problem would exist in Minnesota. Under section 179.52
of the Minnesota statutes, "public employees shall have the right
to designate representatives for the purpose of meeting with the
governmental agency with respect to grievances and conditions of
employment." Moreover, the same statutory section further pro-
vides that:
When a question concerning the representative of employees is rais-
ed by the governmental agency, labor organization, or employees, the
labor conciliator or any person designated by him shall, at the request
of any of the parties, investigate such controversy and certify to the
99. The argument being, of course, that the public employees have
authorized their agent, the union, to enter into the agreement with the
employer on each individual employee's behalf by means of the single
collective bargaining agreement.
100. See note 94 supra and accompanying text; Labor Management Re-
lations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 302(c) (4), 73 Stat. 538 (1959), 29 U.S.C.§ 186 (c) (4) (Supp. I, 1960).
101. See City of Cleveland v. Division 268, Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America, 30 Ohio Op. 395,
407 (C.P. 1945); Mugford v. Mayor & City Council, Baltimore City Cir.
Ct. No. 2, Nov. 15, 1944, in RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYE LAW 166, 168-69 (1946). For example, in the Cleveland case
the court said:
Assuming that the transit board has the power to enter into a con-
tract with a union, it seems to this court that the transit board is
entirely without authority to include therein an agreement designat-
ing Division 268 as sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all em-
ployees including those who are members of other unions. The fact
that Division 268 has as members a majority of the employees is im-
material. Such a law or enabling act passed by the state legislature
or city council would be unconstitutional. It would be tantamount to
forcing all employees to become members of the favored union, and
would be unlawful.
30 Ohio Op. at 407.
[Vol. 45:249
parties in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have
been selected. In any such investigation, the labor conciliator may pro-
vide for an appropriate hearing, and shall take a secret ballot of em-
ployees to ascertain such representatives.10 2
Thus, it would seem that the public employer could agree to recog-
nize one union as the exclusive bargaining agent if that union had
in fact been so designated by the employees. The public employer
would only be agreeing to that which is required by statute.
CONCLUSION
This Note has taken the position that under present Minnesota
law the public employer may legally enter into a collective bar-
gaining agreement. While it is believed that this position is sound
as a matter of strict legal analysis, it must be recognized that the
legal status of the bilateral agreement in public employment will
be subject to conjecture until legislation or definitive judicial de-
cision puts the matter to rest. The major problem is that the law
in this area has not kept pace with the exigencies of modem con-
cepts of the employment relationship. Traditional legal theories
must either be disgarded or at least reappraised to meet the needs
of modem society. Thus, the increasing role of government in
modem society has caused an increasing share of the working
force to be employed by public employers. Correspondingly this
increased role of modem government requires that for the public
interest the best working force obtainable be available to the public
employer. To attain this objective the public employer must be
able to compete with private industry in the labor market. Be-
cause private industry is governed almost entirely by collective
bargaining agreements, it is little wonder that public employees
are not satisfied by unilateral promulgation of rescindible resolu-
tions which incorporate the results of their collective negotiations.
This proposition may well be countered by the assertion that there
is no practical difference between the resolution which will not in
fact be rescinded and the binding bilateral agreement. But the
simple answer to this assertion is that psychology has a lot to do
with the problem. The public employee may feel, with a good
deal of justification, that he is treated as a second-class citizen.
Although the public interest is generally asserted to be the reason
for applying different standards to public employment than those
applied to private industry, the public interest should also demand
the form of labor relationships that will best assure harmonious
and efficient personnel relations. The large number of attorney
general opinions which involve questions submitted by Minnesota
102. MINN. STAT. § 179.52 (1957).
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public employers with reference to proposed or existing collective
bargaining agreements stand as mute evidence of the recognized
necessity for such agreements. Legal theory should be cognizant of
this practical necessity so that collective bargaining agreements
may play a proper role in the future of Minnesota public employ-
ment.
